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INTEREST OF AMICI CURIAE
Amici are scholars who have extensively studied
the constitutional implications of American territorial
expansion.1 Amici have written and edited works about the
Supreme Court’s early-twentieth-century decisions known
collectively as the Insular Cases, in which the Court held
that noncontiguous islands annexed at the end of the
nineteenth century were part of the United States for
some purposes but not for others. Amici take no position on
the merits of Plaintiffs’ constitutional claims but maintain
a scholarly interest in ensuring that the limited scope of
the Insular Cases be accurately understood and that the
“territorial incorporation” doctrine commonly attributed
to these decisions not be further extended.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Amici submit this brief to explain why this Court
should decide this case without reliance on the Insular
Cases. Those decisions in no way inform whether the
Appointments Clause, art. II, §2, cl. 2, at issue here,
1. Amici are Christina Duffy Ponsa-Kraus, George Welwood
Murray Professor of Legal History at Columbia University, Rafael
Cox Alomar, Associate Professor of Law at the University of the
District of Columbia David A. Clarke School of Law, Gary S.
Lawson, Philip S. Beck Professor of Law at Boston University
School of Law, and Sam Erman, Professor of Law at the USC Gould
School of Law. No counsel for a party authored this brief in whole
or in part, and no party or counsel for a party made a monetary
contribution intended to fund the preparation or submission of this
brief. No person other than amici curiae or their counsel made
a monetary contribution to the preparation or submission of this
brief. All parties have consented to the filing of this brief.
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governs the appointment of the members of the Federal
Oversight and Management Board for Puerto Rico.
None of the Insular Cases resolved a claim involving the
Appointments Clause, nor does their reasoning logically
extend to the question this case presents.
Reliance on the Insular Cases here would also
contravene the caution expressed in later decisions of
this Court that the reasoning in those cases—including
the notion of “territorial incorporation”—should not be
extended. That admonition is well founded. As jurists
and scholars have recognized, the Insular Cases rest
on unpersuasive reasoning that is inconsistent with the
original meaning of the Constitution, contrary to nowsettled constitutional analysis, and historically justified
by since-repudiated imperialist and racist ideologies. The
deeply problematic reasoning of the Insular Cases is the
product of another age, and it has no place in modern
jurisprudence, even if (as amici doubt) it once did.
ARGUMENT
I.

The Insular Cases Do Not Determine The Meaning
or Scope of the Appointments Clause

The group of cases commonly referred to as the
Insular Cases concerned the reach of particular provisions
of the Constitution and federal statutes in overseas
territories annexed following the Spanish-American War
of 1898. 2 The first decisions in the series, handed down
2. Scholars differ on the roster of decisions that make up the
Insular Cases, but there is “nearly universal consensus that the
series” begins with cases decided in May 1901, such as Downes
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in 1901, concerned the imposition of tariffs on goods
imported into the territories and exported from them. See,
e.g., Dooley v. United States, 183 U.S. 151, 156-57 (1901)
(duties on goods shipped to Puerto Rico did not violate
Export Tax Clause, U.S. Const. art. I, § 9, cl. 5); Huus
v. New York & P.R. S.S. Co., 182 U.S. 392, 396-97 (1901)
(trade between Puerto Rico and U.S. ports is “domestic
trade” under federal tariff laws). Without exception, these
“Insular Tariff Cases,” De Lima v. Bidwell, 182 U.S. 1, 2
(1901), involved “narrow legal issues.” Kent, Boumediene,
Munaf, and the Supreme Court’s Misreading of the
Insular Cases, 97 Iowa L. Rev. 101, 108 (2011).
Of the early cases, only two concerned the applicability
of constitutional provisions in the newly acquired
territories. The first and leading case, Downes v. Bidwell,
182 U.S. 244 (1901), held that the reference to “the United
States” in the Uniformity Clause of Article I, Section
8—which requires that “all Duties, Imposts and Excises
shall be uniform throughout the United States”—did not
extend to Puerto Rico. 3 The second, Dooley, 183 U.S.
151, held that duties on goods shipped from New York to
Puerto Rico did not violate the Export Clause of Article
I, Section 9, which provides: “No Tax or Duty shall be laid
on Articles exported from any State.” In those decisions,
v. Bidwell, 182 U.S. 244 (1901), and “culminates with Balzac v.
Porto Rico[, 258 U.S. 298 (1922)].” Burnett, A Note on the Insular
Cases, in Foreign in a Domestic Sense: Puerto Rico, American
Expansion, and the Constitution 389, 389-90 (Burnett & Marshall
eds., 2001).
3. As explained in Part I.B infra, Downes’s discussion of
the Uniformity Clause does not resolve the Appointments Clause
question in this case.
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the Court examined whether the geographic scope that
each constitutional clause specified encompassed the
new territories. Dooley held that none was a “State” for
Export Clause purposes; Downes held that they were
not part of “the United States” as that phrase is used in
the Uniformity Clause. As this Court has more recently
explained, “the real issue in the Insular Cases was
not whether the Constitution extended to [territories],
but which of its provisions were applicable by way of
limitation upon the exercise of executive and legislative
power in dealing with new conditions and requirements.”
Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 758 (2008) (emphasis
added).
Downes, the “seminal case of the Insular Cases,”
Sparrow, The Insular Cases and the Emergence of
American Empire 80 (2006), illustrates the limited
scope of the Supreme Court’s inquiry in those decisions.
In Downes, the Court addressed whether the phrase
“throughout the United States” in the Uniformity Clause
encompassed Puerto Rico. A fractured Court produced
a majority only for the judgment, and not for any opinion
supporting it. Justice Brown announced the judgment
but wrote an opinion in which no other Justice joined. He
posited that the phrase “the United States” included only
“the states whose people united to form the Constitution,
and such as have since been admitted to the Union.” 182
U.S. at 277 (internal quotation marks omitted); see id. at
260-61. Justice Brown reasoned that the Constitution’s
terms were not applicable to the territories until Congress
chose expressly to “extend” them. Id. at 251.
That reasoning found no takers: “The other eight
justices rejected [Justice] Brown’s radical view.” Kent, 97
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Iowa L. Rev. at 157. In a separate opinion that marked the
“origin of the doctrine of territorial incorporation,” id.,
Justice White (joined by Justices Shiras and McKenna)
reasoned that the newly annexed territories were not
part of the United States for purposes of the Uniformity
Clause because Congress had not “incorporated” them
by legislation or treaty. 182 U.S. at 287-88 (White, J.
concurring in judgment). Justice White’s novel distinction
between “incorporated” territories and those that
remained “unincorporated” and thus “merely appurtenant
[to the United States] as . . . possession[s],” id. at 342,
eventually commanded the votes of a majority of the Court
in later Insular Cases. See Balzac v. Porto Rico, 258 U.S.
298, 305 (1922) (“[T]he opinion of Mr. Justice White … in
Downes v. Bidwell, has become the settled law of the
court.”).4 Downes articulated a distinction between what
came to be known as “incorporated” and “unincorporated”
territories, which in that case stood merely for the
proposition that the unincorporated territories are not
part of the “United States” as that phrase is used in the
Uniformity Clause. Although Justice White added, in dicta
in his Downes concurrence, that certain constitutional
“restrictions” might be “of so fundamental a nature that
they cannot be transgressed,” 182 U.S. at 291, none of the
Insular Cases held—contrary to what several modern
4. 	Justice White’s opinion in Downes did not explain how a
court was to determine whether Congress had “incorporated” a
territory. In Balzac v. Porto Rico, the Supreme Court explained
that at least as to those territories claimed by the United States at
or after the close of the Spanish-American War (when the concept
of territorial incorporation entered American legal and political
consciousness) congressional intent to “incorporate” a territory
should not be found absent a “plain declaration” of such intent
from Congress. 258 U.S. 298, 306 (1922).
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courts have asserted about them—that the operative
difference between the two kinds of territories is that
only “fundamental” constitutional rights apply in the
latter, whereas the entire Constitution applies in their
incorporated counterparts. 5 That understanding of the
Insular Cases, though persistent,6 is deeply flawed, and
“overstate[s] the[ cases’] holding.” Burnett, A Convenient
Constitution? Extraterritoriality After Boumediene, 109
Colum. L. Rev. 973, 984 (2009).7
5. 	Moreover, Justice White’s distinction between fundamental
and other constitutional rights must be understood in its temporal
context: At the time, the Court had not yet found most of the Bill
of Rights to be “incorporated” against the States through the
Fourteenth Amendment, so most constitutional rights did not
apply even against the States. See generally Burnett, Untied
States: American Expansion and Territorial Deannexation, 72
U. Chi. L. Rev. 797, 824-34 (2005).
6. 	E.g., Davis v. Commonwealth Elections Comm’n, 844
F.3d 1087, 1095 (9th Cir. 2016) (“The Insular Cases held that [the]
Constitution applies in full to ‘incorporated’ territories, but that
elsewhere, absent congressional extension, only ‘fundamental’
constitutional rights apply[.]” (internal quotation marks omitted));
Tuaua v. United States, 951 F. Supp. 2d 88, 94-95 (D.D.C. 2013)
(“In an unincorporated territory, the Insular Cases held that
only certain ‘fundamental’ constitutional rights are extended to
its inhabitants.”), aff’d, 788 F.3d 300 (D.C. Cir. 2015).
7. 	Indeed, that expansive reading “confuses matters, for the
‘entire’ Constitution does not apply, as such, anywhere. Some parts
of it apply in some contexts; other parts in others.” Burnett, 72 U.
Chi. L. Rev. at 821. For example, neither the Seat of Government
Clause, U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 17, which grants Congress
authority over the District of Columbia, nor the Territory Clause,
art. IV, § 3, cl. 2, have ever applied to the States. See id. Other
constitutional provisions have been understood as inapplicable
outside the States, whether a territory was incorporated or not.
See id. at 821 n.102.
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That rights-analysis framework emerged in later
decisions commonly included in the Insular series. Those
decisions, without exception, dealt with the applicability
of specific constitutional provisions concerning individual
rights, and the only rights they held inapplicable
to unincorporated territories were those related to
proceedings in criminal trials in territorial courts—rights
that at the time did not apply in state courts, either. See,
e.g., Balzac, 258 U.S. at 309 (Sixth Amendment right to
jury trial inapplicable in local courts in Puerto Rico);
Ocampo v. United States, 234 U.S. 91, 98 (1914) (Fifth
Amendment grand jury clause inapplicable in territorial
courts the Philippines). Refining the “incorporation”
distinction that Justice White developed in Downes, those
later cases “explained that Congress, despite its plenary
power over all territories, did not have the power to
withhold jury trial rights from incorporated ones, whereas
it could withhold them from unincorporated territories.”
Burnett, 109 Colum. L. Rev. at 991-92. But, again, none
of the Insular Cases demarcated territorial areas where
the Constitution applies “in full” from others where only
fundamental provisions apply.
The Insular Cases could therefore bear on this case
only if they illuminated the proper application of the
specific constitutional provision at issue. They do not. None
of the Insular Cases spoke to the meaning or applicability
of the Appointments Clause.
Moreover, in contrast to the Uniformity Clause, the
Appointments Clause does not define its own geographic
scope. Although the clause contains the phrase “officers
of the United States,” that phrase describes the status
of the officers in question, not the geographic scope of
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the clause—otherwise, one could argue that the clause
does not apply to the appointment of United States
Ambassadors to foreign countries, which would be absurd.
The question in this case is how to reconcile two clauses:
one concerning Congress’s power to govern territories
that belong to the United States, and the other concerning
the President’s power to appoint officers whose authority
springs from the United States. Put differently, the
question is whether the Territory Clause, art. IV, §3,
cl. 2, displaces the Appointments Clause when it comes
to the appointment of officers of the United States to
serve in unincorporated territory. The answer to that
question does not depend on the Insular Cases’ doctrine
of territorial incorporation. That doctrine concerns the
Uniformity Clause (which unlike the Appointments Clause
defines its own geographic scope), or rights provisions
(pursuant to the rights-analysis framework developed in
later cases).
Recognizing the irrelevance of the Insular Cases
to this case, the First Circuit correctly declined to rely
on them in its analysis of whether the Territory Clause
trumps the Appointments Clause. As the court put it in
the final pages of its discussion of that question, “nothing
about the ‘Insular Cases’ casts doubt over our foregoing
analysis.” Aurelius Investment v. Commonwealth, 915
F.3d 838, 854 (1st Cir. 2019) (internal citation omitted).
This Court should adopt the First Circuit’s approach in
this respect, and decline to rely on the Insular Cases in
its analysis of whether the Territory Clause trumps the
Appointments Clause.
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II. The Insular Cases Should Not Be Extended Beyond
Their Holdings
There is a second reason this Court should take
care not to extend the reach of the Insular Cases:
“[N]either the [Insular Cases] nor their reasoning
should be given any further expansion.” Reid v. Covert,
354 U.S. 1, 14 (1957) (plurality opinion); see also Torres
v. Commonwealth of P.R., 442 U.S. 465, 475 (1979)
(Brennan, J., concurring in the judgment) (“Whatever
the validity of the [Insular] cases … those cases are
clearly not authority for questioning the application of the
Fourth Amendment—or any other provision of the Bill
of Rights—to the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico in the
1970’s.” (internal citations omitted)).
The admonition not to expand the Insular Cases’
application is well founded. More than a hundred years
after the Court decided the early cases in the series,
the decisions “remain exceptionally controversial.”
Vladeck, Petty Offenses and Article III, 19 Green Bag
2d 67, 76-77 (2015). Indeed, the territorial incorporation
doctrine attributed to the Insular Cases is unpersuasive
as a matter of constitutional first principles and rests, at
least in part, on archaic notions of racial inferiority and
imperial expansionism which courts and commentators
have emphatically repudiated. For those reasons among
others, the Insular Cases have “nary a friend in the
world,” Fuentes-Rohwer, The Land That Democratic
Theory Forgot, 83 Ind. L.J. 1525, 1536 (2008), and ought
not be expansively read by this Court.
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A.

The Insular Cases And The Territorial
Incorporation Doctrine Are Constitutionally
Infirm

The notion that some territories are “incorporated”
while others are not is constitutionally infirm. The
Constitution’s single reference to “Territor[ies],” U.S.
Const. art. IV, § 3, cl. 2, does not differentiate between
“incorporated” and “unincorporated” territorial lands.
Until the Insular Cases, neither the Supreme Court nor
any other branch of government had even intimated that
such a distinction existed. See Burnett, 72 U. Chi. L. Rev.
at 817-34 (discussing Congress’s plenary power to govern
U.S. territories in nineteenth century). And as this Court
itself explained, the doctrine’s paramount constitutional
vice is that it lends itself to misconstruction as a broad
and generic license to the political branches “to switch the
Constitution on or off at will,” Boumediene, 553 U.S. at
765, by affording them the discretion to decide whether
or not to “incorporate” a territory—an outcome that the
Insular Cases did not sanction, see pp. 5-7 supra, and that
this Court has rejected, Boumediene, 533 U.S. at 757-58.
Concern over the potential misuse inherent in this
vague and unprecedented doctrinal innovation was evident
from the beginning. It is present throughout the fractured
opinions in Downes. The dissenters in Downes reacted
to Justice White’s reasoning, which posited that whether
Puerto Rico was in “the United States” for purposes of
the Uniformity Clause depended on whether Congress
had “incorporated” the territory for those purposes,
by rejecting the idea of territorial “incorporation” as
unprecedented and illogical. “Great stress is thrown upon
the word ‘incorporation,’” wrote Chief Justice Fuller, “as
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if possessed of some occult meaning, but I take it that the
act under consideration made Porto [sic] Rico, whatever
its situation before, an organized territory of the United
States.” Id. at 373 (Fuller, C.J., dissenting). Justice Harlan
was even more mystified: “I am constrained to say that
this idea of ‘incorporation’ has some occult meaning which
my mind does not apprehend. It is enveloped in some
mystery which I am unable to unravel.” Id. at 391 (Harlan,
J., dissenting).
Even though the then-newly minted distinction
between “incorporated” and “unincorporated” territories
eventually attracted a majority of the Court’s votes in
later cases, the distinction was not only unprecedented,
but constituted a significant departure from the Supreme
Court’s prior conception of the Constitution’s application
to the territories. 8 As one of the authors of this brief has
explained, “there is nothing in the Constitution that even
intimates that express constitutional limitations on national
power apply differently to different territories once that
territory is properly acquired.” Lawson & Seidman,
The Constitution of Empire: Territorial Expansion &
American Legal History 196-97 (2004). In part for that
reason, “no current scholar, from any methodological
8. See Downes, 182 U.S. at 359-69 (Fuller, C.J., dissenting)
(citing numerous Supreme Court decisions “[f]rom Marbury v.
Madison to the present day” establishing that constitutional
limits apply with respect to the territories); Loughborough v.
Blake, 18 U.S. (5 Wheat.) 317, 319 (1820) (“[The United States]
is the name given to our great republic, which is composed of
States and territories.”); see also Igartúa de la Rosa v. United
States, 417 F.3d 145, 163 (1st Cir. 2005) (Torruella, J., dissenting)
(Insular Cases were “unprecedented in American jurisprudence
and unsupported by the text of the Constitution”).
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perspective, [has] defend[ed] The Insular Cases.” Lawson
& Sloane, The Constitutionality of Decolonization
by Associated Statehood: Puerto Rico’s Legal Status
Reconsidered, 50 B.C. L. Rev. 1123, 1146 (2008). The
supposed constitutional justifications for the Insular
Cases’ unequal treatment of residents of unincorporated
territories “are certainly not convincing today, if they ever
were.” Kent, Citizenship and Protection, 82 Fordham L.
Rev. 2115, 2128 (2014).
In addition to lacking anchor in constitutional text,
structure, or history, the territorial incorporation doctrine
is in serious tension, if not at war, with the foundational
constitutional principle that “the national government
is one of enumerated powers, to be exerted only for
the limited objects defined in the Constitution,” as the
dissenting justices in Downes first explained. 182 U.S. at
389 (Harlan, J., dissenting); see also id. at 364 (Fuller, C.J.,
dissenting) (noting whatever the bounds of Congress’s
authority over the territories “it did not . . . follow that
[they] were not parts of the United States, and that the
power of Congress in general over them was unlimited”).
Again, as this Court itself has recently acknowledged
in explaining that the Insular Cases have often been
misconstrued, the “Constitution grants Congress and the
President the power to acquire, dispose of, and govern
territory, not the power to decide when and where its
terms apply.” Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 765 (emphasis
added).
In sum, serious constitutional concerns provide
a strong reason for this Court not to decide this case
based on the Insular Cases or any distinction between
incorporated and unincorporated territories.
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B. The Insular Cases Rest On Antiquated Notions
Of Racial Inferiority
The Insular Cases and the territorial incorporation
doctrine cannot be understood without a frank recognition
that they rest in important part on discredited notions of
racial inferiority and imperial governance. See Igartúa de
la Rosa v. United States, 417 F.3d 145, 162 (1st Cir. 2005)
(Torruella, J., dissenting) (noting that the Insular Cases
“are anchored on theories of dubious legal or historical
validity, contrived by academics interested in promoting
an expansionist agenda”); Ballentine v. United States,
2006 WL 3298270, at *4 (D.V.I. 2006) (observing that the
cases were “decided in a time of colonial expansion by the
United States into lands already occupied by non-white
populations” and have “racist underpinnings”), aff’d, 486
F.3d 806 (3d Cir. 2007). This Court should decline to rely
on the Insular Cases for those reasons as well.
The Insular Cases—and in particular, the reasoning
that gave rise to the territorial incorporation doctrine—
reflected turn-of-the-century imperial fervor and a
hesitancy to admit into the Union supposedly “uncivilized”
members of “alien races” except as colonial subjects.
Writing in Downes, for example, Justice Brown suggested
that “differences of race” raised “grave questions”
about the rights that ought to be afforded to territorial
inhabitants. 182 U.S. at 282, 287 (describing territorial
inhabitants as “alien races, differing from us” in many
ways). Similarly, Justice White’s analysis was guided
in part by the possibility that the United States would
acquire island territories “peopled with an uncivilized
race, yet rich in soil” whose inhabitants were “absolutely
unfit to receive” citizenship. Id. at 306. Justice White
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quoted approvingly from treatise passages explaining
that “if the conquered are a fierce, savage and restless
people,” the conqueror may “govern them with a tighter
rein, so as to curb their impetuosity, and to keep them
under subjection.” Id. at 302 (internal quotation marks
omitted).
The dubious—and in many ways, pernicious—
foundations of the territorial incorporation doctrine were
the handmaidens of the ill-conceived and short-lived
U.S. turn toward formal imperial expansion. The most
significant grouping of Insular Cases reached this Court
following the Nation’s annexation of overseas territories
after the Spanish-American War. “Although continental
expansion had previously provoked constitutional
questions, never before had the United States added areas
this populated and this remote from American shores.”
Sparrow, The Insular Cases, p. 4 supra, at 4. Moreover,
“[w]hen the Supreme Court reached its judgments in
the Insular Cases, prevailing governmental attitudes
presumed white supremacy and approved of stigmatizing
segregation.” Minow, The Enduring Burdens of the
Universal and the Different in the Insular Cases, in
Reconsidering the Insular Cases, the Past and Future of
the American Empire vii, vii (Neuman & Brown-Nagin
eds., 2015). As a result, the “outcome [of the Insular Cases]
was strongly influenced by racially motivated biases and
by colonial governance theories that were contrary to
American territorial practice and experience.” Juan R.
Torruella, The Insular Cases: The Establishment of a
Regime of Political Apartheid, 29 U. Pa. J. Int’l L. 283,
286 (2007); see also Gustavo A. Gelpí, Manifest Destiny:
A Comparison of the Constitutional Status of Indian
Tribes and U.S. Overseas Territories, 63 A.P.R. Fed.
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L. 38, 39-40 (2016) (Insular framework is “increasingly
criticized by federal courts . . . as founded on racial and
ethnic prejudices”); Kent, 82 Fordham L. Rev. at 2128
(noting Supreme Court offered “frankly racist” rationales
in key Insular Cases).
The decisions “reflected many of the attitudes that
permeated the expansionist movement of the United
States during the nineteenth century.” Rivera Ramos,
Puerto Rico’s Political Status, in The Louisiana Purchase
and American Expansion, 1803-1898, at 209 (Levinson
& Sparrow eds., 2005); see Sparrow, The Insular Cases,
supra, at 10, 14, 57-63. That “ideological outlook” included
“Manifest Destiny, Social Darwinism, the idea of the
inequality of peoples, and a racially grounded theory of
democracy that viewed it as a privilege of the ‘Anglo-Saxon
race.’” Rivera Ramos, Puerto Rico’s Political Status, p.4
supra, at 170. These concepts of “inferior[ity] . . . justified
not treating [territorial inhabitants] as equals,” and
the Insular Cases’ classification of some territories as
“unincorporated . . . owed much to racial and ethnic
factors.” Id. at 171, 174; see Go, Modes of Rule in America’s
Overseas Empire: The Philippines, Puerto Rico, Guam,
and Samoa, in Louisiana Purchase, supra, at 209, 217
(use of “racial schemes for classifying overseas colonial
subjects”—from “Anglo-Saxons . . . at the top of the ladder,
while beneath them were an array of ‘lesser races’ down
to the darkest, and thereby the most savage, peoples”—
“served to slide the new ‘possessions’ . . . into the category
of ‘unincorporated’”).
Put simply and at the risk of understatement, the
racial and colonizing underpinnings of the Insular
Cases are “now recognize[d] as illegitimate.” Burnett,
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109 Colum. L. Rev. at 992; see also Sam Erman, Almost
Citizens: Puerto Rico, the U.S. Constitution, and Empire
161 (2019) (describing “the rare and shocking spectacle of
case law as racist as [the Insular Cases] remaining largely
untouched by time”). Such notions have no place in modern
jurisprudence, and courts have rightly repudiated these
views in modern case law. This Court should therefore
take care not to expand the Insular Cases beyond their
specific facts or to give further vitality to these decisions.
CONCLUSION
Amici respectfully urge this Court not to rely on
the Insular Cases in resolving Plaintiffs’ constitutional
challenges.
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